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The Networked City: Managing Power and Water 
Utilities in Portugal, 1850s-1920s 
Álvaro Ferreira da Silva and Ana Cardoso de Matos 
This paper explores the evolution of power and water systems in 
Portugal throughout the period of urban infrastructure 
modernization. The network characteristics of electricity, gas, and 
sanitary equipment are emphasized, not only in its economic and 
technical characteristics, but also in its impact on management, 
regulation, and initial installation. Regulatory issues and conflicts 
between private entrepreneurs and public authorities are 
particularly emphasized. Sometimes they provided the path to 
municipalization. Otherwise, the outcome of these conflicts 
enhanced regulatory mechanisms and long-term relationships 
between public and private institutions. The analysis of agency 
problems and the theory of contracts are used as the main 
theoretical devices to explain the outcome of these relationships. 
 
 
The motivation for this paper comes from the economics literature on 
network utilities, which emphasizes high sunk costs, asset specificity, 
classic natural monopoly issues, and the need for coordination throughout 
all the parts of the system to maintain its efficiency.1 The latter 
characteristic is the one most closely related to the network feature 
assumed by urban utilities. 
Our aim in this paper is to explore the impact of these 
characteristics on the evolution and management of gas, electricity, and 
water systems between 1850 and 1920. This period was selected for several 
reasons. First, it was during these decades that the urban infrastructure 
was modernized, gas and water supply systems began, and later reached 
maturity. The same was true of electricity at the end of the nineteenth 
                                                   
1 David M. Newbery, Privatization, Restructuring and Regulation of Network 
Utilities (Cambridge, Mass., 2000). 
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century. This period is also relevant to issues related to the private and 
public management of public services. In mid-nineteenth-century 
Portugal, private management was considered the normal way to deal with 
the provision of goods and services; the supply of water, gas, and, later, 
electricity did not divert from this assumption and practice. Limited-life 
franchises, which gave private entrepreneurs a local monopoly, prevailed 
as the organizational solution to running these networked industries. 
However, private companies’ performance and problems related to the 
private provision of local services led to consideration of public 
management as a possible alternative. Therefore, we will explore the 
network characteristics of the supply of water, gas, and electricity in an 
attempt to illuminate the central issues related to their establishment, 
evolution, and management. 
This paper reflects the two different research paths undertaken by 
the authors.2 The first path is dedicated to water supply and the sanitary 
equipment connected with sewers. The second path deals with gas and 
electricity supply. The association of these utilities derives from the fact 
that public lighting was the common ground linking municipal authorities 
with the companies operating in the sector. 
A Typical Case of Positive Externalities: The Development of 
Sanitary Equipment Throughout the Second Half of the 
Nineteenth Century 
The Sanitary Revolution. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a 
sanitary revolution was underway across Europe and North America. This 
was a movement aimed at cleaning up the cities through the provision of 
purer water supplies and better sewage disposal, and through the paving 
of streets and control of the urban layout of cities.3 This sanitary 
                                                   
2 The bibliographical references exemplify the research on water supply and 
sewer systems undertaken by Álvaro Ferreira da Silva. Ana Cardoso de Matos has 
been working on gas and electricity supply. We are starting a common research 
project on urban infrastructures in Portugal. 
3 Gordon E. Cherry, “Public Policy and the Morphology of Western Cities: The 
Example of Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries” in The Rise and 
Fall of Great Cities: Aspects of Urbanization in the Western World, ed. Richard 
Lawton (London, 1989), 32-44; Jean-Pierre Goubert, “The Development of Water 
and Sewerage Systems in France, 1850-1950” in Technology and the Rise of the 
Networked City in Europe and America, ed. Joel A. Tarr and Gabriel Dupuy 
(Philadelphia, Pa., 1988), 116-136; Anne Hardy “Smallpox in London: Factors in 
the Decline of the Disease in the Nineteenth Century,” Medical History 27 
(1983): 111-138; John von Simson, “Water Supply and Sewerage in Berlin, 
London and Paris: Developments in the 19th Century,” in Hans Juergen 
Teuteberg, Urbanisierung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert: Historische und 
Geographische Aspekte, ed. Hans Juergen (Koeln, 1983), 428-439; Anthony 
Sutcliffe, “Environmental Control and Planning in European Capitals, 1850-1914: 
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revolution was responsible for changing the conditions of city life. Several 
changes in the way water was distributed and consumed, as well as other 
transformations in the removal of human and animal waste from the city, 
set off a new and healthier urban environment, responsible for a dramatic 
decrease in mortality rates in urban areas.4 
The organization of water supply and sewers based on networks 
supported the technological innovations in sanitation.5 We define modern 
water supply as water provision based on a network system that relies on 
centralized, piped water, substituting for water sold in containers or 
manually carried from a local street fountain. The introduction of modern 
waterworks marks a movement away from reliance on a localized and 
labor-intensive water-supply process towards a more capital-intensive 
system, organized in a network, and automated. 
The same is true with the sewer system. Traditionally, human waste 
disposal was based on cesspools and privy vaults. From time to time, 
scavengers contracted by the cities cleaned the privies and took away the 
waste to rural areas, because of its potential use as manure. This process 
was labor-intensive and inefficient, creating both aesthetic nuisances and 
health problems. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, cities with 
sewers usually employed them for storm-water drainage rather than 
                                                                                                                                           
London, Paris and Berlin,” in Growth and Transformation of the Modern City, 
ed. Ingrid Hammarström and Thomas Hall (Stockholm, 1979), 71-88; Joel A. 
Tarr, “Building the Urban Infrastructure in the Nineteenth Century: An 
Introduction,” Essays in Public Works History 14 (December, 1985): 61-85; 
Anthony S. Wohl, Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian Britain 
(London, 1983). 
4 Jeffrey K. Stine and Joel A. Tarr, “At the Intersection of Histories: Technology 
and the Environment,” Technology and Culture 39 (4, 1998): 601-640; Richard 
A. Easterlin, “How Beneficent is the Market? A Look at the Modern History of 
Mortality,” European Review of Economic History 3 (December, 1999): 257-294. 
For the argument concerning the technological character of this sanitary 
revolution see Álvaro Ferreira da Silva, “Running for Money: Municipal Trade in 
Lisbon (1860-1910)” in Comparative Aspects of Urban Infrastructure in the 19th 
and 20th Centuries: Technology, Finance and Regulation, ed. Andrea Giuntini, 
Peter Hertner, and Gregorio Núñez (forthcoming). 
5 For further references concerning these networked utilities see Jean-Pierre 
Goubert, “The Development of Water and Sewerage Systems in France, 1850-
1950” in Technology and the Rise of the Networked City in Europe and America, 
ed. Joel A. Tarr and Gabriel Dupuy (Philadelphia, Pa., 1988), 116-136; Joel A. 
Tarr, “Water and Wastes: A Retrospective Assessment of Wastewater Technology 
in the United States, 1800-1932,” Technology and Culture 25 (25, 1984): 226-264; 
Joel A. Tarr, “Building the Urban Infrastructure in the Nineteenth Century: An 
Introduction,” Essays in Public Works History 14 (December, 1985): 61-85; Joel A. 
Tarr and Josef W. Konvitz, “Patterns in the Development of the Urban 
Infrastructure,” American Urbanism: A Historiographical Review, ed. Howard 
Gillette Jr. and Zane L. Miller (New York, 1987), 195-226. 
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human waste removal. In many cases, local ordinances even prohibited the 
placing of human waste in these storm sewers.6 In contrast, the water 
carriage system of waste removal introduced an automated, centralized, 
and capital-intensive system to solve sanitary problems created by the old 
human waste disposal methods. The major technological innovation 
behind this system was the use of water as a draining and cleansing agent, 
in order to remove solid waste from the toilet flush and the sewer pipes. In 
addition, there were several changes in the design of the pipes and the 
network, to assist this automated cleaning. By covering the whole city with 
a network of oval-shaped sewer pipes and adapting the slope of the pipes 
to the topography, it was possible to remove water and solid waste. 
Both the water supply infrastructure and the new sewer system 
associated with this technological revolution in sanitation had some 
peculiar characteristics. They had to be considered systems in their own 
right and this network characteristic meant that coordination throughout 
all the parts of the system was essential for its efficiency (systemic and 
site-specific characteristic). These networks had to be planned much 
further in advance than the actual demand when they were created 
(prospective characteristic). Finally, the crucial element that 
revolutionized sanitation throughout the second half of the nineteenth 
century was the interrelationship of the modern water supply and the 
solution to the waste disposal problem through a modern sewer system 
(interrelation of technological systems). 
It was a nineteenth-century assumption that private enterprise was 
the best solution for running modern waterworks. This assumption was 
backed by contemporary economics and supported by public opinion. 
Private enterprise was considered more efficient for dealing with agency 
problems within the firm. However, supplying water is not like other 
businesses. First, the very nature of the technological system involved is 
such that the large amount of capital invested in waterworks (aqueducts, 
dams, pipes, and reservoirs) is a perfect example of an economic activity 
where sunk costs are very high. These high sunk costs are associated with 
assets that are specific to water supply and would be difficult to transfer to 
another economic activity. Waterworks such as aqueducts or pipes laid 
under the streets are of no use for any other purpose. The specificity of the 
investment, the high sums of capital involved, and the concentration of the 
economic activity in the supply of only one good, prevents an easy exit 
from the industry or strategic decisions regarding enlarging the scope of 
the business. As a network utility, partial investment in any portion of the 
network only makes sense and is effective if the performance and 
organization of the whole system is efficient. Modern water supply is a 
                                                   
6 As was the case in Lisbon at the time, see Álvaro Ferreira da Silva, Crescimento 
urbano, regulação e oportunidades empresariais, Lisboa 1860-1930 [Urban 
Growth, Regulation and Business Opportunities, Lisbon 1860-1930] (Ph.D. diss. 
European University Institute, Florence, 1997). 
Álvaro Ferreira da Silva and Ana Cardoso de Matos // Networked City 5
classic case of a natural monopoly, where a single firm can satisfy the 
entire market demand at lower total cost than any other combination of 
firms.7 The network itself is an obvious case where duplication raises the 
total cost of supplying a market. Therefore, a single firm providing a good 
or a service might be tempted to abuse its position in the market. Finally, 
there are positive externalities associated with water provision. From the 
point of view of nineteenth-century sanitary problems, continuous and 
abundant water consumption was essential for dealing with urban health 
problems. 
However, the superiority of private management in dealing with 
water supply was taken for granted for most of the nineteenth century. 
Public administration had to provide order, fight fires, and maintain 
public spaces, but it could not intervene in other initiatives. Private 
enterprise was seen as the proper institutional form for dealing with the 
modernization of the water supply. The provision of water to the cities was 
not considered fundamentally different from other economic activities, 
since there were several contractual conditions that had to be agreed upon 
to deal with the specificities of the business.8 
Therefore, by the mid-nineteenth-century, private operation under 
a limited franchise monopoly constituted the prevalent institutional 
alternative. It owed much to the contemporary experience of railroad 
construction and operation, as well as to the theoretical principles 
associated with the work of Edwin Chadwick. He differentiated traditional 
market competition, “competition within the field,” which assumed a large 
number of firms competing in the market, from “competition for the field,” 
which was based on competition between several bidders to have the 
exclusive right to supply water to the entire local market.9 This competitive 
bidding process would in some way replicate the social efficiency of 
“competition within the market.” 
                                                   
7 William W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge, U.K., 1982). 
8 “Parliament did not regard water supply as in any way different from normal 
speculative ventures, and relied on the workings of market forces and the 
potential of competition to safeguard the public interest,” writes Malcolm E. 
Falkus when discussing the situation in England in the first half of the nineteenth 
century; see Falkus, “The Development of Municipal Trading in the Nineteenth 
Century,” Business History 19 (2, 1977): 140. Robert Millward also emphasizes 
that in the same period water and gas supply were treated as ordinary goods by 
the administration and public opinion, and “private enterprise was seen as the 
proper institutional form.” See Robert Millward, “Emergence of Gas and Water 
Monopolies in Nineteenth-century Britain: Contested Markets and Public Control,” 
in New Perspectives on the Late Victorian Economy: Essays in Quantitative 
Economic History, ed. James Foreman-Peck (Cambridge, U.K., 1991), 99. 
9 Harold Demsetz, “Why Regulate Utilities?,” Journal of Law & Economics 11 
(April, 1968): 55-65; Robert B. Ekelund and Robert F. Hébert, A History of 
Economic Theory and Method (New York, 1990). 
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However, the efficiency of such proposals depends ultimately on the 
design of the contracts, the power of vested interests, the behavior of the 
judiciary towards litigation between administration and private 
enterprises, and information on the industry. The design of these private 
enterprise contracts to regulate the water supply involves several features 
stressed by institutional economics in the relations between principal and 
agent. Bounded rationality and the costs of acquiring and processing 
information were certainly present in planning the work and investment 
needed to supply a certain quantity of water or in forecasts of future 
population evolution. This was common to both the administration and 
the private utility. 
Opportunistic behavior might also be present. A private enterprise 
will attempt to deliver services that are more profitable rather than more 
efficient, choosing either higher or lower quality or cost, depending on the 
incentives it faces. The regulator opportunistically takes advantage of the 
costly investment in sunk and specific assets to threaten the enterprise, 
reneging on contractual clauses or trying to renegotiate contracts, so that 
the utility fears it may become a hostage of the regulator. 
This summary of the characteristics of the modern urban water 
supply infrastructure illustrates the reasons why public regulation was 
needed and why public supply later became a realistic solution to the 
problems associated with the provision of such a good. 
Water Supply in Portugal in the Early Twentieth Century. At the 
beginning of the last century, most Portuguese towns with more than 
5000 inhabitants were without a modern water supply system.10 Only 17 
percent of these towns had a piped water supply and for some of them the 
water supply was of inferior quality.11 For instance, in Setúbal and 
                                                   
10 This overview of water supply is based on the Inquerito de salubridade das 
povoações mais importantes de Portugal [Inquiry Into the Sanitation of the 
Most Important Towns in Portugal] (Lisboa, 1903), a large and detailed source of 
information on water supply and sewage disposal across Portugal at the 
beginning of the twentieth century based on a survey distributed to towns in 
1901. The information on cities with modern water supply presented in this 
source was supplemented by data from local studies and the survey published in 
1935: Inquérito sobre o saneamento de aguas e saneamento das sedes de 
concelho [Inquiry on Water Supply and Sanitation of the Towns Head of 
Municipalities], Ministério das Obras Públicas e Comunicações, 1935. Because 
data from both surveys are not entirely consistent, information provided by local 
studies was used to identify cities and towns with modernized water supply. 
Matosinhos was not considered to be independent from Oporto in the 
Montenegro survey, and the same criterion was used in Table 1. 
11 As a reference, this number might be compared with the situation in England in 
1914: of 1,130 boroughs and other urban districts outside London, only 2.6 
percent were without piped supplies; see John Hassan, A History of Water in 
Modern England and Wales (Manchester, U.K., 1998), 22. The proportion of 
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Santarém water quality was poor, and even in Oporto, the second largest 
city, water provision was polluted by dirty leaks. Nevertheless, in towns 
where the water supply had not been modernized the quality was even 
more appalling.12 
If we look at the urban hierarchy, most of the largest Portuguese 
cities did not have a modern water supply. At the top of the urban 
network, Lisbon and Oporto (with 356,000 and 168,000 inhabitants, 
respectively) had piped water provided by private companies. However, 
the third largest city, Braga, with 22,000 inhabitants, had a traditional 
water supply, based on fountains and springs, without piped water to 
households. The fourth largest Portuguese city, Setúbal, with 19,000 
inhabitants, relied on a private company to provide households piped 
water. With the exception of Coimbra (with 16,000 inhabitants), all the 
other major cities had a traditional water supply. 
The quantity of water provided by fountains in the cities without 
modern water systems was not much less than the amount provided in the 
few cities where the system had been modernized. For instance, fountains 
and springs supplied Braga. However, the water volume per capita was not 
much lower than in Setúbal, the city immediately below it in the urban 
hierarchy, which had a private, piped water supply.13 Other cities at the top 
of the urban hierarchy relying on a traditional water supply illustrate this 
comparison even better. All of these received more than 45 liters per 
inhabitant each day, which was more than what was provided by the 
private company in Oporto, where the daily water supplied per inhabitant 
was around 40 liters. In the case of Évora, whose population did not grow 
very much after the early modern period, the second longest aqueduct 
built in Portugal provided a record 196 liters per day of water, twice the 
per capita water supply in Lisbon at the time.14 Nevertheless, it was the 
modern waterworks in the Portuguese capital that had the largest water 
supply per capita of all eleven cities and towns with a piped water supply. 
There are several institutional options for managing a modern 
water supply. The first is public management and ownership of the 
waterworks and the whole infrastructure. The second is public ownership 
                                                                                                                                           
boroughs with piped water in Portugal for the same year (1914) would give a very 
different result: only 27 (less than 11 percent) of the Portuguese towns, which 
were heads of municipal districts, had piped supplies (see Table 2). 
12 For the towns listed in the survey, 36 percent described the water consumed by 
the population as bad. In some cases it was very polluted, constituting a serious 
health problem. 
13 In Braga, daily water supply per capita was 25 liters, and in Setúbal, 28 liters. 
14 The Aqueduto da Água da Prata was built in the seventeenth century. The 
longest aqueduct was built in Lisbon throughout the first half of the eighteenth 
century. For a description of Évora’s aqueduct see Maria Filomena Mourato 
Monteiro, O Aqueduto da Água da Prata em Évora [The Água da Prata’s 
Acqueduct in Évora] (Masters thesis, Universidade de Évora, 1995). 
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of the infrastructure, with a limited-life franchise monopoly granted to a 
private company. The third possibility is entirely in the private sector, with 
a private company as the owner of the waterworks and operator of the 
supply to the households. There is a fourth option, which is typically the 
case for a traditional water supply based on personal and small-scale 
provision: individuals or communities own the springs and wells and 
organize a water supply to either their own household and premises, or to 
a small neighborhood. 
 
TABLE 1 
Water supply at the beginning of the twentieth century 
 
Modern Water Supply and Urban Network  
Cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants 9 
Cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants with modern water supply 4 
Towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants 41 
Towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants with modern water supply 7 
Total number of towns with modern water supply 9 
Institutional Options to Manage Water Supply  
Towns with private concession  
Towns with municipal supply and private concession 3 
Towns with municipal supply 2 
Water Provided in Towns with Modern Water Supply (lhd) 
4 < 30 liters 
30-60 liters 2 
100 liters 1 
“Plentiful supply” 2 
Water Quality and Quantity for All Towns in the 1901 Survey 
Water supply with good quality 110 
Water supply with deficient quality 62 
Water supply in small quantities 23 
Source: see note 7. 
lhd = liters per head per day 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the nine Portuguese 
towns with modern water provision relied mainly on private management, 
with or without infrastructure ownership. Only two, Santarém and 
Coimbra, had water provision managed by local authorities. The main 
difference among these nine towns was the level of monopoly. In three 
situations private operators coexisted with a public supply. In these cases, 
pre-existing waterworks (aqueducts, pipes, reservoirs, springs, and 
fountains) were maintained by the municipality rather than integrated 
into the infrastructure managed by the private company. This pre-existing 
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infrastructure continued to be publicly run to supply fountains where 





Periods of installation of piped supplies in Portuguese towns, 




# of Boroughs 
with Piped 
Supplies 
% of Boroughs 
with Piped 
Supplies 
Before 1901 12 12.5 
1901-1910 7 7.3 
1911-1920 10 10.4 
1921-1930 38 39.6 
1931-1935 29 30.2 
Total 96 100.0 




Source: see note 10. 
 
A typical example of this situation was the second largest 
Portuguese city, Oporto. Water supply was contracted out to a private 
company, the Companhia das Águas do Porto, owned by the French 
Compagnie Générale des Eaux pour l’Étranger, but the municipality did 
not give up the existing city waterworks, managed by the local authorities. 
Public pipes, aqueducts, reservoirs, and fountains remained under city 
control and the water was used both for municipal services consumption 
and for providing the population with public fountains. Only provision of 
piped water to households by Oporto city council was forbidden.15 After 
the 1920s, with respect to municipal control over the water supply, both 
public and private infrastructures were consolidated under unified 
management. 
The 1901 survey covered 183 Portuguese towns; the proportion that 
had modernized their water supply was 5 percent. By the mid-1930s, the 
situation had improved. However, by European standards the availability 
of modern waterworks was still very rare, as is shown in Table 2. Both 
water quantity and quality provided to households by modern waterworks 
were deficient at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
                                                   
15 Contract between the Portuguese government and the Compagnie Générale des 
Eaux pour l’Étranger signed on 22 April 1882. 
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Designing the Regulatory Framework for Networked Water Supply. 
Private management’s superiority in dealing with the water supply was 
taken for granted for most of the nineteenth century. When the modern 
water supply became a political issue in Portugal, however, the arguments 
in favor of private management were much less insightful. The governance 
model was absent from consideration in the options for modernizing the 
water supply even in Lisbon, which anticipated and modeled technical and 
organizational solutions for other Portuguese towns.16 The first 
governmental proposal tendering bids to provide piped water to Lisbon 
stated the importance of supplying water “in the same fashion used in 
other European cities, where private companies are responsible for the 
introduction of new and modern habits in personal hygiene.”17 This 
reference to institutional arrangements used abroad was the only 
justification for proposing an end to public management of the Lisbon 
waterworks, which had begun with the construction of the eighteenth-
century aqueduct.18 
Further discussion of the water supply to Lisbon, mainly 
concerning the conflict between the municipality and the private company 
that gained the franchise monopoly in 1856, added another argument to 
                                                   
16 The first detailed presentation of the solutions for improving the water supply 
to Lisbon was made by Pedro José Pézerat, Dados e estudos para um projecto de 
abastecimento de agoas e sua distribuição em Lisboa, mandados confeccionar e 
publicar pela Camara Municipal da mesma cidade [Data and Studies for a 
Water Supply Project to the City of Lisbon] (Lisbon, 1855). There was no 
reference to the organizational form for water supply, even though the implicit 
solution was public administration. The same was true of the discussion between 
two members of the city council published in Augusto de Carvalho, Reflexões 
acerca do abastecimento de agoas e sua distribuição na capital [Reflections on 
Water Supply and Distribution in the Capital City], Lisbon, 1853 or in the 
technical report made by Carlos Ribeiro, Considerações geraes sobre a grande 
conserva d’aguas projectada na Ribeira de Carenque mandadas publicar pela 
Camara Municipal de Lisboa [General Considerations on the Dam Projected to 
the Ribeira de Carenque, Published by the Municipal Council of Lisbon] (Lisbon, 
1854). 
17 Preamble to the 22 Dec. 1852 Decree. 
18 This aqueduct, which even today is visible in Lisbon’s landscape, was begun in 
1731 and was built over the course of a century. Its water reached the city in 1748, 
but the infrastructure of additional public works did not end until 1835. At the 
time, the municipality substituted the state administrative body that was running 
the construction and the operation since the beginning of the works in 1731, 
establishing the first experience of municipal management. See Jorge das Neves 
Larcher, Memória histórica sobre o abastecimento de água a Lisboa até ao 
reinado de D. João V [Historical Memoir on Water Supply during the Reign of D. 
João V] (Lisbon, 1937); Augusto Pinto de Miranda Montenegro, Memoria sobre 
as aguas de Lisboa [Memoir on the Water in Lisbon] (Lisbon, 1895); Luís Leite 
Pinto, Subsídios para a história do abastecimento de água à cidade de Lisboa 
[Subsidies into the History of Water Supply in Lisbon] (Lisbon, 1973). 
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justify private management. The financial burden on the public 
administration was very heavy, thus the capital needed to carry out the 
modernization of the water supply would have to be raised by private 
investors. The granting of a license to a private company, which could 
raise capital by issuing shares to the public, appeared to offer the best 
prospect of improving water supplies, given the capital-intensive nature of 
the modern waterworks.19 
However, the production details associated with water supply, the 
high sunk costs, and the specific requirements of waterworks led potential 
private entrepreneurs to secure their property rights against opportunistic 
behavior from the administrative body that granted the franchise. From 
the point of view of private investors, several dangers might be anticipated 
to arise. These can be summarized in two areas. The first was the need to 
reward such a large, specialized investment. As this was a new business 
needing time to mature, concerns about capital return were inevitable. The 
administrative guarantee of a minimum rate of return on the investment 
could have been a solution to this problem, as was common in private 
railway companies. Another might have been an extension of the term of 
the limited franchise monopoly, in order to secure property rights and 
allow formulation of long-term strategies. The second area is related to the 
fact that the municipality was the water company’s most important 
customer. Thus, the company feared it might become a hostage of the local 
administration or of decisions made by the central government. As the 
specificity of assets prevented an exit from the business, there were strong 
incentives to make very detailed contracts, attempting to cover any 
possible situation that might lead the firm into a hostage situation. 
From the consumer’s point of view, private management of the 
water supply also had several shortcomings in need of contractual 
regulation. The fact that a firm held a monopoly increased the possibility 
of it abusing its market position by raising prices or lowering service 
standards. The aim of introducing a modern water supply system was to 
increase the quantity and quality of water supplied, particularly given the 
importance of the need to improve sanitary conditions. Therefore, private 
water suppliers had to address this general goal and do the work needed to 
bring larger quantities of water into the city and make the service available 
to the entire population. 
The regulatory framework approved for the water supply in Lisbon 
between 1852 and 1867 is important for two reasons. First, it provided the 
principles that other cities would copy. Second, analysis of the framework 
reveals the weaknesses of the regulatory apparatus and possible reasons 
                                                   
19 For a more extensive examination of the Lisbon water supply, see Álvaro 
Ferreira da Silva, “The Peculiar Customer: Conflicts of Power and the Modern 
Water Supply System in Lisbon,” in Réseaux techniques et réseaux de pouvoir 
dans les villes européennes (XIXe siècle-début XXe siècle), ed. Denis Bocquet 
(Rome, forthcoming). 
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for the recurrent conflicts between the private company and the public 
administration. 
Some principles reappeared in other contracts: compulsory 
purchase powers similar to the railroad companies’; exemption from 
import duties and any tax until the capital invested had reached a net 
profit of 5 percent; the need for administrative approval for all 
waterworks.20 The definition of property rights was also common to other 
situations in the nineteenth century and adapted the traditional principles 
and terminology peculiar to copyhold land tenancy. The public 
administration was the “direct owner” (proprietário directo) of all the 
waterworks, old (the Aqueduto das Águas Livres, for instance) and newly 
constructed. The private company received, for the period of the 
concession, the “useful property” (domínio útil) of all the waterworks and 
springs. At the end of the contract, the “useful property” would become 
consolidated with the “direct property.” In some other concessions 
(Oporto, Cascais, Barcelos), the municipality continued to run the pre-
existing infrastructure, which in most cases, in addition to the water 
sources only included some reservoirs, pipes, and fountains. The private 
company had a monopoly on the responsible for providing piped water. 
However, at the end of the contract the waterworks constructed and 
managed by the company would be incorporated into the public domain. 
Table 3 includes a summary of the main clauses set down in 
contracts and contests, beginning with the first tendering bid in order to 
provide water to the city (1852)21 and ending with the second franchise 
monopoly granted to the Companhia das Águas de Lisboa (1867), a 
contract which provided most of the regulatory framework for Lisbon until 
1932 and acted as a model for water provision by private enterprises in 
other cities.22 A small number of clauses have been selected to facilitate 
the comparison and to illustrate the main aspects regulated by the 
contracts. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this process is the 
tentative approach used to design a regulatory framework for water 
                                                   
20 See for instance the rules for Oporto’s water supply contest (12 Aug. 1880) and 
the contract signed between the government and the concessionaire for Oporto 
water supply on 22 March 1882. Both the clauses for tendering bids and the 
contract reproduced most of the rules of the Lisbon contracts, mainly the one 
signed in 1867. 
21 Another contest to provide water to the city was announced in 1849. See 
Montenegro, Memoria…,. However, it did not set any conditions for potential 
competitors. This contest had no bidders. 
22 Other addenda to the 1867 contract were signed between 1867 and 1932. 
However, they changed or clarified only a few clauses of the first contract. A 
summary of the legislation concerning water supply in Lisbon was published in 
Boletim da Comissão de Fiscalização das Obras de Abastecimento de Água à 
Cidade de Lisboa [Bulletin of the Committee for the Surveillance of the Water 
Supply Works in the City of Lisbon], 1937, 11. 
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supply. The contrast between the 1852 and the 1855 contests is 
particularly striking.23 The former presented hardly any contractual 
conditions for the competitive bidders. It set only the time span for the 
concession and the volume of water to be provided. 
The provisional contract with Duarte Meddlicott, which served as 
the basis for the 1855 contest, constitutes a turning point in water supply 
regulation through concession contracts. It has not been possible to trace 
the negotiations between the public administration and these 
entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, it seems that the foreign entrepreneurs 
brought to Portugal conditions from other countries’ water supply 
contracts that had been absent from the previous contests because of the 
government’s inexperience with these types of agreements. 
For the first time, this provisional contract and, simultaneously, the 
directive for the bidding process, represented the main items included in 
all other contracts throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. It 
even included a clause (omitted from the Table 3 summary) precluding 
opportunistic behavior by the franchised enterprise: during the last five 
years of the contract, the municipality had to control any attempts made 
by the firm to lower its standard of service; the firm had to act in 
conformity. 
Moreover, both the 1855 contest clause and the 1856 contract 
included price regulation as an alternative to rate of return regulation, 
which was explicitly rejected in both documents.24 As an alternative, it 
stipulated both the maximum price for water sold by the company and the 
minimum volume of water the company had to provide to the capital city. 
Thus, the regulatory method was price regulation combined with a 
predetermined standard of service. 
This regulatory method was maintained throughout the period. The 
setting of a maximum price was an attempt to prevent the enterprise from 
exploiting its market position. The standard of service addressed the 
positive externalities associated with water supply as an industry. In 1898, 
municipal participation in company profits was added to simple price 
regulation. The company equally shared net profits with the city when 
dividends were more than 6 percent, an example of price regulation 
method with profit sharing. This new contract also changed the tariff 
policy of the company by introducing regressive tariffs and a fixed 




                                                   
23 The 1849 contest is absent from this analysis; the law allowing the government 
to open the contest did not set any conditions at all, not the volume of water to be 
provided, nor the duration of the concession. 
24 On the different methods of regulation, see W. Kip Viscusi et al., Economics of 
Regulation and Anti-Trust (Lexington, Mass, 1992). 







Main conditions in different contracts or contests to provide water to 
Lisbon (1852-1867) 
 
 1852 1855 1858 1867 
Time span for 
the concession 
20 years 80 years 80 years 99 years 
Time span for 
public takeover 
with indemnity 
 50 years 50 years 45 years 
Total quantity of 
water, lhd 






All the water 
needed with the 




All the water 
needed with the 
exception of the 
water for cleaning 
the sewers 
1/3 of the volume 
supplied by the 
company 
Consumer base  
Piping into the 
households not 
compulsory 










Per capita water 
charges must 
increase at the 
same rate as the 
population 
Per capita water 
charges must 
increase at the 




















Sources: Contracts and bidding clauses for the following years: 
1852: Conditions for a tendering bid in order to supply water to 
Lisbon (22 December). 
1855: Provisional contract with the Duarte Meddlicott group. The 
clauses in this provisional contract provided the base for the new 
tendering bid (13 August). 
1858: Contract with the Companhia das Águas de Lisboa, which 
won the 1855 contest (29 September). 
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1867: New contract with the Companhia das Águas de Lisboa, 
after the 1864 crisis between the company and the administration 
(27 April). 
lhd = Litres per head per day. The calculation of lhd for 1852, 1855 
and 1858 used the population of Lisbon in the respective year. 
 
The 1867 contract marked the second turning point in the 
contractual regulation of the water business. It represented an attempt by 
the Portuguese company to both secure the contract it had gained 11 years 
earlier and to achieve a sustainable demand. The minimum quantity of 
water per head per day increased more than 60 percent. The implicit 
assumption was that the need to increase water supply was in the distant 
future. Moreover, such an increase in the previous minimum threshold 
constituted a strong argument for securing the concession, after the 1864-
1867 crisis in relations between the municipality and the company.25 In 
this context, the clause requiring the water supply to increase at the same 
rate as the population disappeared between 1858 and 1867. It was an 
important change and left the administration without a contractual device 
to control company performance over the long-term. 
The other major contractual change, in attempting to secure the 
concession, was the new quota for administrative use. The contract 
dramatically increased the volume of water to be made available to the 
local administration and removed the exception for public use of the water 
supply, the water needed for sewer cleaning. Because the 1858 contract 
was never put into effect, due to its interruption in 1864, the water volume 
in excess of the municipal quota that could be used for cleaning the sewers 
was never calculated. Increasing the municipal quota, without exceptions, 
was an interesting clause for the administration, because cleaning sewer 
pipes was one of the most important municipal purposes for the water the 
city council received.26 This became the source of many clashes between 
the concessionaire and the administration during the following decades, 
until 1932. 
Another innovation in the 1867 contract was compulsory piping as a 
way to shape and maintain a solid consumer base. It was also a rule in the 
first contract with the Oporto concessionaire in 1882. From the 
perspective of the company, this clause could be considered the corollary 
of price regulation. Because government did not guarantee the rate of 
                                                   
25 Álvaro Ferreira da Silva, “The Peculiar Customer: Conflicts of Power and the 
Modern Water Supply System Lisbon,” in Réseaux techniques et réseaux de 
pouvoir dans les villes européennes (XIXe siècle-début XXe siècle), ed. Denis 
Bocquet (Rome, 2002). 
26 Water for cleaning sewer pipes was so badly needed that the 1898 contract 
allowed the city council to break the company’s monopoly of water provision. The 
municipality was able to get water from the Tagus River and carry it by special 
pipes to clean the sewers. 
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return, enlarging the consumer base by administrative rather than market 
means was critical to the company, especially in light of the waterworks’ 
large investments to collect water from Alviela. However, without a tariff 
to encourage consumers’ adherence, this administrative measure would 
have been of little use in enlarging the consumer base.27 A new policy with 
the partial objective of a minimum level of consumption and regressive 
tariffs was not introduced in a contract revision until 1898. However, 
following the arrival of the Alviela water in Lisbon in 1885, which 
produced a relative excess in water supply, the tariff policy was not 
adjusted to respond to this supply. 
 
TABLE 4 










1870-1874 7,665 - - - - 
1875-1879 13,097 71 - - - 
1880-1884 23,689 81 1,391,961a - 35.8 a 
1885-1889 33,727 42 1,619,911 16 29.2 
1890-1894 40,290 19 1,723,766 6 26.0 
1895-1899 42,617 6 1,788,761 4 25.6 
1900-1904 47,911 12 2,178,960 22 27.7 
1905-1909 56,506 18 2,940,965 35 31.7 
1910-1914 65,422 16 3,341,468 14 31.1 
 
Notes: lhd = liters per head per day. Consumers’ lhd takes into 
account only the company’s consumers, not the entire population of 
Lisbon (thus, it measures only the water privately consumed, not public 
uses). Compare with Table 6, column 3, in which all the water (public and 
private) and the entire population of the city are considered to calculate 
the water per capita. 
a 1883 and 1884 
 
                                                   
27 The 1867 contract stipulated compulsory piping, but household tenants were 
not obliged to become customers and consume piped water. Residents could 
continue to rely on public fountains and on free sources of water. 
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The evolution of consumers and private consumption in Lisbon 
reflects the company’s tariff policy (see Table 4). The number of 
consumers increased significantly throughout the years 1870-1894, 
particularly after the 1880 approval of the compulsory piping regulation. 
Water consumption did not show similar growth rates during the same 
period, as is well illustrated in the evolution of consumption per head 
among the company customers (see Table 4, last column).28 The levels of 
water consumption per head per day not only were very low, but steadily 
decreased until the end of the century. This trend changed after the 
approval of the new tariff in 1898, suggesting that the water price policy 
did not produce the consumption expansion strategy on which the 
administrative decision to introduce compulsory piping was based. 
Finally, the 1867 contract also introduced a new institutional 
arrangement for providing current regulation over the company’s 
operation. The 1855 provisional contract, clauses for the contest, and the 
1856 contract all stipulated that the government and the municipality 
should have two representatives on the company’s board of directors. The 
large municipal assets (previous waterworks belonging to the Aqueduto 
das Águas Livres) given in tenure to the Companhia das Águas justified 
the presence of these representatives on the board. In 1867, an 
independent body was created, a committee of control whose members 
were appointed by the government and the municipality, the function of 
which was to survey company activities. An arbitration committee was 
established to deal with disputes between regulator and company. 
Agency Problems in Water Management and Regulation: The 
Municipalization Threat. Contracts and the other regulatory devices did 
not prevent conflicts between the concessionaire and administration, 
mainly with the local city council. The 1858 contract was very detailed 
compared with the governmental terms of reference for the 1852 contest. 
The 1867 contract was even more comprehensive. However, all of these 
contracts were discussed for years, a situation repeated for the contract 
signed between the municipality of Oporto and the French concessionaire 
for water supply to the second largest Portuguese city.29 Limited 
rationality from economic agents prevents anticipating every possible 
situation that might occur in relations between the company and its 
customers, or the company and the administration. The perfect contract, 
regulating the private company concession, and securing business 
                                                   
28 Unfortunately, the company’s accounts did not give details on private 
consumption before 1880, preventing comparison between consumers and 
consumption at the beginning of the series. 
29 In the case of Lisbon the decision concerning the 1855 bid became public in 
1856, but the contract was signed in 1858. The new contract, in 1867, ended a 
long process of negotiation begun in 1865. The Oporto contest was decided in 
1880, but the contract was signed in 1882. 
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expectations in a new industry as well as consumers’ prospects, was 
beyond their reach. 
Some issues provided a motive for recurrent disputes between the 
administration and the private concessionaires for water supply in Lisbon 
and Oporto. One of the most important and frequent of these was the 
companies’ non-observance of the works project stipulated in the contract 
and in further agreements. This failure to comply with previous 
agreements affected the companies’ ability to supply the quantity of water 
stipulated in the contract and within the agreed deadlines. In Lisbon, this 
was the reason for the government’s decision to break off the contract with 
the concessionaire in 1864, as well as for crises in 1888 and the 1920s.30 In 
Oporto, the delayed signing of the contract in 1882 was due to the 
renegotiation of some of the clauses that provided the basis for the 1880 
contest. Later, the 1882 contract was also renegotiated to accommodate 
some demands from the company. The volume of water supplied was far 
below the threshold of 100 liters per head per day, proposed as the basis 
for bidding. Furthermore, insufficient numbers of the steam engines 
necessary for taking the water to the company’s reservoirs to be 
distributed by the network had been acquired.31 
Another source of conflict was the need for companies to enlarge 
their consumer base. In Lisbon an attempt was made to do this through 
was the aforementioned compulsory piping of households. The dispute 
between the city council and its opposition, the Associação Comercial de 
Lisboa (a business association), was fierce, and a great debate ensued in 
the newspapers and the Parliament. In Oporto, the 1882 contract also 
contained an obligation to link households to the company’s main pipes. It 
stipulated that when the construction of the modern waterworks was 
complete and the company began supplying water to the pipes, a law to 
enforce mandatory water piping for all houses whose revenue was higher 
than a certain threshold should be approved, with installation costs to be 
paid for by the owners. The company ended construction of the 
waterworks in 1886, and requested the contractual clause be applied, thus 
making water piping compulsory.32 Conflict with the population, business 
associations, and opinion makers followed, just as it had in Lisbon. 
The third cause of conflict between the administration and private 
operators was the amount of water available for municipal use. In every 
contract, there was a clause stipulating that the municipal council should 
receive a certain amount of water for free. Any excess would be charged at 
                                                   
30 Even before signing the contract in 1858, the company attempted to drop some 
of the waterworks provided for in the conditions for the 1856 contest. This was 
the main reason for the delay in the signing of the 1858 contract. 
31 The municipality and the company agreed to this change to the previous 
contract in August 1887. 
32 It was approved by the municipal council in May 1886 and immediately 
applied. 
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a reduced price (as a rule, half the average tariff to private consumers). 
The Lisbon case represented the greatest difficulties, as the municipality of 
Oporto had access to its own water supplies.33 The situation concerning 
disagreements about the amount that should be paid for public 
consumption beyond the volume of water supplied for free started to 
deteriorate in the 1880s, due to with the accumulation of several years of 
municipal debts. The municipality contested the charge for this excess 
water, saying that the company was trying to force the city council to pay 
for its own inability to enlarge private consumption and its 
entrepreneurial inefficiency. It also argued that the margin for leaks and 
the resulting water loss, which artificially expanded public consumption, 
was higher in Lisbon than in any other city.34 
It is difficult to disentangle the truth from the arguments presented 
by the company and the local administration. In fact, the municipality 
occupied the most important place in the water consumption structure 
and its position did not change much throughout the period under 
consideration (see Table 5). Thus, it is true that the company showed poor 
performance in enlarging private consumption, transforming the local and 
central administrations into the main revenue sources for the private 
company. The local administration’s position as a consumer might be 
compared with the situation in England, at the beginning of the period 
displayed in Table 5; in 1882 in forty-eight leading provincial towns only 
6.3 percent of the water was supplied for public use, compared with 60.3 
percent delivered to domestic households, and 33.4 percent used by 
industry and trade.35 
Finally, contracts with such a long time-span (almost a century) had 
to move in line with population growth and increase in accordance with 
the demand dictated by new patterns of comfort. Scientific discoveries, 
proposing new methods to guarantee drinking-water quality and 
protection against threats to its purity, also influenced regulator-utility 
relations. Gradually, the credibility of bacteriological water analysis 
increased and chemical methods became less important in guaranteeing 
water quality.36 Increasingly, the bacteriological analysis methodology was 
                                                   
33 However, when municipal consumption increased, the Oporto municipality 
asked that the amount of water to be provided by the company for municipal uses 
be renegotiated (new contract in 1901). 
34 In fact, the municipality stressed that the losses due to water leaks were only 10 
percent of the water supplied to Lisbon, when in other countries the proportion 
was 20-30 percent; see Actas das Sessões da CML [Proceedings of the Municipal 
Council’s sessions], 21 July 1919, p. 131. 
35 J. A. Hassan, “The Growth and Impact of the British Water Industry in the 
Nineteenth Century,” Economic History Review 38 (Nov. 1985): 542. 
36 For the development of bacteriology in medicine and its effects on disease 
control see Jean-Nöel Biraben, “Pasteur, Pasteurization and Medicine” in The 
Decline of Mortality in Europe, ed. Roger Schofield, David S. Reher, and Alain 
Bideau (Oxford, U.K., 1991); J. Mokyr and R. Stein, “Science, Health and 
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acknowledged as crucial to certifying water purity.37 In Lisbon, on the 
occasion of typhoid outbreaks in 1907, water quality was implicated as a 
possible cause of the many deaths. Infiltrations in water pipes coming 
from cesspools and old sewer pipes were responsible for the spread of such 
water-borne outbreaks.38 Pressures on the utility to modernize its quality-
control methods became a new source of conflict. 
 
TABLE 5 
Companhia das Águas de Lisboa 
Public consumption of water (cubic meters), 1883-1914 
 
  Public Consumption 
 Total 
Consumption 
Total  % of Total 
Consumption
Municipal  % of Total 
Consumption
      
1883-
1884 
5,948,572 4,556,611 77   
1885-
1889 
8,635,995 6,976,318 81   
1890-
1894 
8,460,427 6,558,216 78 5,209,761 62 
1895-
1899 
8,369,300 6,466,056 77 5,028,442 60 
1900-
1904 
9,547,789 7,261,195 76 5,750,331 60 
1905-
1909 
11,971,270 8,966,992 75 7,186,552 60 
1910-
1914 
13,239,006 9,836,152 74 7,703,909 58 
 
Source: Álvaro Ferreira da Silva, “The peculiar customer: conflicts 
of power and the modern water supply system Lisbon,” in Denis Bocquet 
                                                                                                                                           
Household Technology: The Effect of the Pasteur Revolution on Consumer 
Demand” in The Economics of New Goods (Chicago, 1997); G. Rosen, A History 
of Public Health, ed. T. F. Bresnahan and R. J. Gordon (New York, 1958); C.-E. A. 
Winslow, The Conquest of Epidemic Disease (Princeton, N.J., 1943). 
37 Christopher Hamlin, “Edwin Chadwick and the engineers, 1842-1854: the 
Systems and Anti-Systems in the Pipe-and-Brick Sewers War,” Technology and 
Culture 33 (Oct. 1992): 680-709; John Hassan, A History of Water in Modern 
England and Wales (Manchester, U.K., 1998). 
38 In 1913, a new typhoid outbreak led to the very first proposal for the creation of 
bacteriological purification stations. In addition, a new program for waterworks 
to improve the quantity and quality of water provision was considered. In Oporto, 
the 1903 typhoid outbreak raised the same concerns over water quality. 
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(ed.), Réseaux techniques et réseaux de pouvoir dans les villes 
européennes (XIXe siècle-début XXe siècle), (Rome, 2002). 
In addition, urban growth constituted a threat to water supply per 
capita levels in the first phase of waterworks modernization. The problem 
was particularly acute in Oporto, where the first concession only provided 
about 40 liters per head per day. From the start, this was a very small 
volume of water compared with international standards and technical 
opinion at the time.39 In Lisbon, the volume of water followed the 
population increase (see Table 6, column on consumption lhd). However, 
it did not reach the contractual minimum threshold level of 100 liters per 
head per day, and was also well behind other cities at the time; the average 
consumption was over 150 liters per capita in English, French, and 
German cities.40 Italian cities, such as Rome, Florence, Turin, and Milan 
had private consumption in 1908 above 110 liters per capita per day.41 It 
must be noted that those ratios included all the water consumed in the city 
of Lisbon, including industrial and municipal uses. If private consumption 
were isolated, then the average consumption per head per day would fall to 
less than 30 liters, when considering the level of consumption in 1900 (see 
Table 4).42 These were very low levels of consumption, particularly 
because they include only the company’s private customers, who were 
mostly well-off city residents. 
These issues were responsible for systematic conflicts between the 
concessionaire and the administration. The case of Lisbon provides a clear 
                                                   
39 In 1864, Henry Gavand estimated 40 liters per head per day to be the 
minimum level, not including the water needed by the local administration, 
which would double this estimate. See Henry Gavand, Estudo sobre o 
abastecimento d’agua da cidade do Porto [Study on the Water Supply to the City 
of Oporto] (Lisbon, 1864). At the end of the nineteenth century Montenegro cited 
several estimates, proposing an average consumption per head of more than 140 
liters (see Montenegro, Memoria...,). In 1913, in the United States water 
consumption per head per day at the household level, aside from industrial or 
public use, was 60 liters per day, for a household with 2 taps, one water closet, 
and one bath. 
40 Marjatta Hietala, Services and Urbanization at the Turn of the Century: The 
Diffusion of Innovations (Helsinki, 1987), 101 and 201-202; Jean-Pierre Goubert, 
“The Development of Water and Sewerage Systems in France, 1850-1950” in 
Technology and the Rise of the Networked City in Europe and America, ed. Joel 
A. Tarr and Gabriel Dupuy (Philadelphia, Pa., 1988). 
41 A. Raddi, “Il consumo ed il prezzo dell'acqua potabile in alcune città italiane,” 
in Revista di ingegneria sanitaria, n. 23 (1912). 
42 This calculation included only private consumers, not public consumption or 
the large proportion of the Lisbon population who did not have piped supplies, as 
is evident in Table 5. It was well below the levels of consumption proposed by 
Gavand 40 years earlier; see Gavand, Estudo... (Lisbon, 1864). 
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example of the problems and has been discussed in detail elsewhere.43 It 
also represents the first time possible municipalization of the water supply 
was considered. 
TABLE 6 



















6.2 - 94 0.887 7.624 
1880-
1889 
47.1 88.4 157 0.594 1.462 
1890-
1899 
57.3 74.5 161 0.434 0.766 
1900-
1909 
63.7 74.1 402 0.408 0.702 
1910-
1919 
65.5 74.5 318 0.426 0.679 
 
lhd = liters per head per day 
Financial Autonomy = Capital/Total Assets 
Solvency Ratio = Capital/Liabilities 
 
In 1866-67, there was a great debate on the best way to manage the 
Lisbon water supply. Two years earlier, the government had denounced 
the private company contract and granted the municipality of Lisbon 
administration of the waterworks. However, the private company 
(Companhia das Águas de Lisboa) did not accept the solution, invoked 
property rights in order to preserve the franchise monopoly, and proposed 
a new contract to the government. Nevertheless, the city council supported 
its position for municipalization with arguments from the technical 
committee, appointed by the government in 1863 to analyze the water 
supply situation and propose the best solution.44 
The technical committee favored municipalization. First, water 
provision was presented as being closely related to the drainage and sewer 
system. Both contributed to the improvement of sanitary and health 
                                                   
43 Álvaro Ferreira da Silva, “The Peculiar Customer: Conflicts of Power and the 
Modern Water Supply System in Lisbon,” in Réseaux techniques et réseaux de 
pouvoir dans les villes européennes (XIXe siècle-début XXe siècle), ed. Denis 
Bocquet (Rome, forthcoming). 
44 Municipal petition to the government, 21 March 1866, Archivo Municipal, 
1866, pp. 2623-2626. 
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conditions, and work on either system needed to be planned in tandem.45 
Water supply could be a profitable business, enabling improvements in the 
sewer system through use of revenues from providing water to homes. 
Second, a need as fundamental as the water supply should not be managed 
by a private monopoly. The positive externalities associated with water 
supply and the common fears that private concessionaires would abuse 
their market position were emphasized. The technical committee believed 
only public management would simultaneously ensure moderation in 
price, quality of service, and extended social coverage. It was the only way 
“to promote greater consumption, indispensable to the improvement of 
public sanitation, to the creation of better hygienic habits and to the 
expansion of industries.”46 
The municipal administration’s position had several weak points. 
The first was technical.47 Even if it was undeniable that efficient water 
provision would benefit urban sanitation, the principle of water-carriage 
for waste drainage was not included in the plan to modernize the sewer 
system. Only the 1880 technical committee proposals for the 
modernization of the sewers conclusively advanced this solution. It must 
be remembered that in 1871, Bernardino António Gomes, a distinguished 
doctor and hygiene expert, favored a different solution based on 
traditional manual removal.48 In the 1860s, every waste removal proposal 
addressed to the municipality advocated manual cleaning of privies and 
cesspools, and proposed pipes only for the draining of rain runoff and 
residual home water. Therefore, the defense of the water-carriage system 
as a new technology to deal with sewage problems was not considered as a 
possible solution at that time. In other urban contexts, it provided 
                                                   
45 “The issues related with cleaning and drainage, as well as with water provision 
are so closely linked that they cannot be considered in isolation, both because 
they both contribute to improving sanitary conditions, and because the work to 
be done in the sewage system or in the water provision should follow the same 
plan” [Municipal Petition to the Government], Archivo Municipal, 1866, p. 2623. 
46 Ibid., 2624. Based on the technical committee position, the municipal 
administration wrote a petition to the government supporting municipalization. 
The municipal petition ended with the demand that the city council be given the 
management of Lisbon water provision, and went on to ask for permission to 
contract a loan in order to finance the work needed to modernize the water 
supply. 
47 The financial and organizational problems will not be discussed here. For a 
longer explanation see Álvaro Ferreira da Silva, “Running for Money: Municipal 
Trade in Lisbon (1860-1910),” in Comparative Aspects of Urban Infrastructure 
in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Technology, Finance and Regulation, ed, Andrea 
Giuntini, Peter Hertner, and Gregorio Núñez (forthcoming). 
48 Bernardino António Gomes, O Esgôto, a Limpeza e o Abastecimento das 
Aguas em Lisboa [The Sewers, the Cleaning and Water Supply in Lisbon] 
(Lisbon, 1871). 
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arguments for the municipalization of water, but it did not influence the 
government or public opinion in Lisbon. 
The reasons that led to a call for municipalization in other urban 
contexts, such as the extreme sanitary problems or the refusal of private 
monopolies to run water supply service, were present in the Portuguese 
capital. However, the new sewer technology based on the water carriage 
system was not adopted, and did not constitute an added, compelling 
reason for municipalization. Furthermore, the municipality’s financial 
resources were insufficient for the large investment needed to promote the 
modernization of the water supply. 
Even after the definitive concession of the water supply to the 
Companhia das Águas de Lisboa in 1867, there were two other occasions 
before the end of the nineteenth century that municipalization could have 
provided the solution to improving water provision. The first occasion was 
in 1872 when the company presented its project of “private piping 
regulation,” obliging all new buildings to be connected to the water 
network. Because the 1867 contract stipulated compulsory connection to 
the water network, government non-compliance would have required 
substantial compensation to the company. However, the reasons 
preventing municipalization in 1866-1867 (the lack of municipal funds and 
the absence of the water-carriage principle in proposals for the 
modernization of the sewer system) persisted in 1872. 
The second occasion for municipalization occurred in 1887, 
following the report of a committee appointed to settle three points of a 
dispute between the public administration and the private concessionaire: 
the late approval of the “private piping regulation,” which caused a 
shortfall in the company’s expected revenues; disagreement about the 
amount of public consumption that the company should be paid for; and 
conflict concerning the responsibility of the concessionaire for the failure 
to provide 100 liters of water per head per day. The final report of the 
committee suggested that the contract be revoked and municipalization be 
introduced. In spite of opposition from a majority of the city council and 
republican propaganda against the private concession, the government 
backed down when faced with a legal dispute with the company and the 
amount of compensation that shareholders would have to be paid.49 The 
price tag of municipalization precipitated a compromise. Throughout the 
1880s, the company had consolidated its economic position, enlarged the 
number of consumers (via the compulsory connection to the water 
network), become profitable, and witnessed a strong rise in its share 
                                                   
49 As the company’s shares almost doubled between 1882 and 1883, increasing 
the company’s value, municipalization became more expensive. On the evolution 
of share prices see Table 6 and Álvaro Ferreira da Silva, “The Peculiar Customer: 
Conflicts of Power and the Modern Water Supply System Lisbon,” in Réseaux 
techniques et réseaux de pouvoir dans les villes européennes (XIXe siècle-début 
XXe siècle), ed. Denis Bocquet (Rome, 2002), Figure 1. 
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value.50 In addition, any attack against a company with many shareholders 
would prejudice the State’s reputation in the financial markets. A resort to 
debt, a structural characteristic of the Portuguese financial system in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, was the only means of financing the 
public budget deficit.51 Therefore, the State’s position was tenuous. The 
late 1880s were particularly difficult for the Portuguese State, as well as for 
the municipal council, due to the deteriorating financial situation that led 
to the 1891-1892 bankruptcy and abandonment of the gold standard. 
Summing up, it would be an exaggeration to say that 
municipalization was omnipresent in the relations between the local city 
council and the water company. However, it haunted periods of harsher 
conflict, becoming a menace. These conflicts between the administration 
and the water company emphasize the limitation of contracts and the 
existing regulatory framework. Periodic revision of contracts adjusts 
regulatory agreements to changing circumstances or unexpected 
outcomes. 
The relations between company and regulator also reveal 
opportunistic behavior on both sides. The situation related to municipal 
consumption is a clear example of this issue, well identified in regulation 
theory. This was amplified by the peculiar characteristic of the 
municipality of Lisbon, that is, its importance as a customer, which 
intensified opportunistic behavior from the regulator’s side. 
Systems Integration and Municipalization. To recapitulate, the state of 
economic knowledge in the nineteenth century, as well as public opinion, 
emphasized the superiority of private enterprise for modernizing 
waterworks and supplying water to the cities. It was assumed that private 
enterprise was the most appropriate institutional form for dealing with the 
supply of goods and services that were private by definition (that is, it is 
possible to prevent some individual from using or consuming a certain 
good or service). Private agents can better solve the inevitable agency 
problems associated with the management of hierarchal relationships 
within the firm. 
                                                   
50 See Table 6. da Silva, “The Peculiar Customer” and Álvaro Ferreira da Silva, 
“Público e privado na modernização das infra-estruturas: o abastecimento de 
água a Lisboa no século XIX,” [Public and Private in the Modernization of Urban 
Infrastructures: Water Supply into Lisbon in the Nineteenth Century] Urbanismo 
e Infra-estruturas Urbanas, XVIII Encontro da Associação Portuguesa de 
História Económica e Social (Lisbon, 1998), present a more detailed analysis of 
the firm’s performance in the 1880s. 
51 J. B. de Macedo, Álvaro Ferreira da Silva and Rita Martins Sousa, “War, Taxes 
and Gold: The Inheritance of the Real,” in Transferring Wealth and Power from 
the Old to the New World: Monetary and Fiscal Institutions in the 17th through 
the 19th Centuries, ed. Michael D. Bordo and Roberto Cortés-Conde (Cambridge, 
U.K., 2001), . 
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In order to deal with positive externalities, natural monopoly 
issues, give guarantees to private entrepreneurs with high volumes of sunk 
capital invested, and simultaneously maintain the social benefits of 
competition, a new institutional form developed: competition to win the 
franchise monopoly for provision of some good or service. This solution, 
largely practiced in urban infrastructures, relies heavily on the efficiency of 
contracts as regulatory devices to deal with the peculiarities of this kind of 
industry. Modern water supply systems and the Portuguese experience in 
the second half of the nineteenth century exemplify this situation. 
However, problems of agency were not solely dependent on 
relations within the firm. Once the franchised firm had a monopoly 
granted by public authorities and contractual clauses governing its 
operation, another problem of agency arose from the relationship between 
the utility and the administration. The franchised firm and the regulator 
had different goals and the solution for problems of agency between them 
involved high transaction costs, namely dealing with bounded rationality, 
opportunistic behavior, and specificity of assets. 
We can analyze the contracts and conflicts of power between 
regulator and franchised firm in the case of the Lisbon water supply from 
this perspective. The main contractual documents regulating the franchise 
monopoly reveal a tentative, trial and error approach, and the influence of 
foreign models. They also disclose the concerns of regulator and utility. 
Price regulation, without any administrative means to reward sunk costs, 
came face to face with difficulties in giving any incentives to the enterprise 
other than the long-term franchise contract. Compulsory piping (in the 
1867 contract) was the answer to this dilemma, using this administrative 
constraint to amplify the consumer base, rather than relying entirely on 
market mechanisms to gain an investment return on the large waterworks 
in the 1870s. However, until 1898 the price policy of the Companhia das 
Águas de Lisboa did not promote higher levels of consumption. 
The issues responsible for conflicts of power between the private 
company supplying the service and the public administration may be 
summarized in four main areas: the quantity and quality of the water 
provided; the day-to-day operation of the company; the positive 
externalities arising from an efficient water supply; and the importance of 
the municipality as a customer. 
The positive externalities resulting from an efficient water supply 
were exceptionally important in nineteenth-century cities. The significance 
of water for proper urban sanitary conditions was recognized as a crucial 
issue at the time. The decisive element that revolutionized sanitation 
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century was the 
interrelationship between a modern water supply and the solution of waste 
disposal through a modern sewer system. 
Water played a critical role in the solution of the nineteenth century 
sanitation question. Abundant and universal provision of water was 
needed to introduce new technology in sewerage: the water carriage 
Álvaro Ferreira da Silva and Ana Cardoso de Matos // Networked City 27
system of waste disposal. If water were not provided in sufficient 
quantities, filth would accumulate in the sewer pipes, counteracting the 
benefits derived from the automated process of waste disposal. Without 
piped water to most households, sanitation technology based on a 
centralized system would be inefficient, presenting a clear case of market 
failure and externalities related to water provision. 
The impact of the modern sewer system in the rise of water 
consumption is even clearer when we look at the distribution of water 
consumption by domestic use (see Table 7). A water-closet increased 
domestic water consumption by almost one third; thus, shortcomings of 
the water supply limited the spread of a modern waste carriage system.52 
Where this system proliferated without an adequate water supply “the 
result was a public health crisis and the circumstances which contributed 




Distribution of household water consumption 
by different fittings (1913) 
 
 lhd  % 
One kitchen tap 20.9 35.0 
Additional tap 4.2 7.0 
One water-closet 19.0 31.8 
One bath 15.6 26.2 
Total consumption 59.7 100.0 
 
Source: Adapted from John Hassan, A History of Water in Modern 
England and Wales (Manchester, U.K., 1998), Table 2.1 
lhd = liters per head per day 
 
In addition, even without an integrated modern sewer system in 
operation, the existing municipal sewers in Lisbon needed increasing 
water supplies, as the rapid growth of municipal consumption 
demonstrates (Table 5). This was one of the primary reasons why the 
municipality was the main company customer throughout the period 
considered here. 
With extended social coverage and improved water supply, the city 
would become healthier, as recognized in the 1864 report of the technical 
committee appointed to assess water company service in Lisbon. Private 
                                                   
52 Anthony S. Wohl, Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian Britain 
(London, 1983). 
53 John Hassan, A History of Water in Modern England and Wales (Manchester, 
U.K., 1998). 
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water supply was judged to be inefficient in addressing the social and 
health aspects related to the strict relationship between water and the 
sanitary conditions of the city. 
All these reasons pushed the municipality to take over the water 
supply. Positive externalities from the consumption side are the most 
important motive in other contexts.54 When there are positive externalities 
at the consumption level and extraordinary transaction costs, incentives 
are high to municipalize the water supply to internalize these externalities. 
In Lisbon in the latter half of the nineteenth century, regulatory devices 
were imperfect and there were recurrent conflicts between regulator and 
utility. Contemporary observers emphasized the positive externalities that 
would arise from an improved water supply and in view of the appalling 
conditions of urban sanitation and low water consumption levels. 
Moreover, just as systems integration between the water supply and 
the sewer system was critical to a revolution in nineteenth-century 
sanitation, there was another incentive to municipalization. Vertical 
integration between both systems, consolidated under municipal 
management, occurs with municipalization of the water supply. 
Theoretically, vertical integration becomes an alternative when 
transactions demand specific investments and there are high costs 
associated with servicing contracts. As a result, technical interdependency 
between sewerage and water supply, coupled with high transaction costs 
associated with regulation, was a strong incentive to consolidating 
management in one entity: the public administration. 
In the case of Lisbon, another reason emerges. The recurrent bitter 
disputes between the water company and the municipality, which were 
virulent at times, were the result of their peculiar relationship. The local 
administration was by far the company’s largest customer, as well as its 
main debtor, which forever poisoned their relationship. Calculating the 
actual amount of water consumed by the administration above the 
assigned quantity was a permanent source of controversy. As a result of 
this peculiar relationship between client/regulator and utility, there was a 
powerful motivation for the municipality to take control away from the 
private company. Aside from any public health reason that might arise 
from better, cheaper, and extended water provision, efforts to control the 
water supply can best be explained as an attempt to centralize 
administration of a service whose main consumer was the city council. 
However, the Lisbon water supply was not municipalized in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. To reiterate, financial problems 
associated with the very limited municipal revenues, and technical issues 
                                                   
54 Silva, “The Peculiar Customer”; Robert Millward, “Privatisation in Historical 
Perspective: the UK water industry,” in Money, Trade and Payments: Essays in 
Honour of D. J. Coppock, ed. David Cobham, Richard Harrington, and George 
Zis (Manchester, U.K., 1989); Hassan, “The Growth and Impact of the British 
Water Industry.”  
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related to the underdevelopment of the modern sewer system, were the 
main reasons the municipalization did not occur. 
The economic impact of the First World War, together with 
quantity and quality complaints about the water supply, launched another 
wave of municipalization. At the end of the 1910s, the private water 
companies in Lisbon and Oporto that remained from the nineteenth 
century franchise water supply companies faced mounting energy costs55 
and wage demands from employees56 in a situation of political and social 
unrest. Tariff increases were banned by contract, unless authorized by the 
government. Administrative decisions on the revision of water tariffs 
demanded hard and long negotiations, with short-lived governments. With 
escalating prices the financial position of the companies weakened and 
investment in waterworks vanished.57 
The Companhia das Águas do Porto was municipalized in 1927, 
after a long process that began in 1920 with the creation of a committee to 
analyze water supply conditions in Oporto. The municipality paid an 
indemnity of 3,500 contos de réis to the company to take over the 
waterworks. 
In Lisbon, the process was very similar, but it did not end in 
municipalization. The reasons for this different outcome are discussed 
elsewhere. The high cost of the indemnity to consolidate the franchise 
monopoly before the end of the contract was one of the reasons.58 The 
other reason was the difference in water supply situations in Oporto and 
Lisbon. The situation in the second largest Portuguese city was worse in 
terms of both the quantity and the quality of water provided. The French 
company invested very little in waterworks and its response to the 
difficulties generated by the war was to lower the quality of the service 
provided. In addition, the Companhia das Águas de Lisboa had a large 
numbers of stakeholders (almost all Portuguese). 
                                                   
55 As a result of the wartime crisis in the provision of strategic goods, the price of 
coal increased as it, too, became scarce. At the end of the 1910s, Portugal suffered 
a large currency devaluation, which aggravated the cost of imported goods. At the 
time, the water companies tried to find substitutes for coal, which was used by 
the steam engines that carried the water, using gas or firewood. Some of Lisbon’s 
reservoirs also substituted electric power for steam power. 
56 In 1917 and 1919, two strikes paralyzed the company in Lisbon. The first one 
involved the intervention of military forces to protect the premises and 
equipment. In 1920, the Oporto water company also had to face workers’ wage 
demands. 
57 By 1924, the price index had increased 24 times since the First World War 
began, with annual inflation rates in double figures. For instance, in 1920 the 
inflation rate was 73% and in 1921, 57%. 
58 The arbitration committee fixed the indemnity at almost 21,000 contos de réis 
(Actas das Sessões da CML, 14 Feb. 1926) Considering the high cost of 
municipalization, the city council decided to give up the contractual possibility of 
taking over the company before the end of the contract. 
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The Lisbon water supply problem was not only technical (the need 
to increase water volume and prevent bacteriological contamination), but 
also financial (the financially weakened private company needed to secure 
the capital for large investments). The solution was an original one: 
private property rights were maintained, but a tight regulatory framework 
emerged, which took all authority away from the Companhia das Águas de 
Lisboa concerning share dividends, new works, and financial 
organization.59 The attitude of the new authoritarian regime was 
characteristic of its typical position with regard to private enterprise: it 
attempted to create a barrier between the past and the future, honoring 
property rights, but introducing changes that transformed actual 
institutional operations (in this case, of the Lisbon water company) of 
those experiencing intervention.60 As an illustration of the new regime’s 
nature and disposition, the negotiation for a new contract was presented 
by the Public Works Minister as follows: if the company accepted the 
contract clauses completely and unconditionally, it would continue as 
concessionaire; should it fail to accept them, the State would act on its 
right to rescind the franchise. 
Networks of Power: The Development of Gas and Electricity in 
Portugal 
Introduction of Gas Supply. The creation of gas networks in Portugal was 
initiated in the mid-nineteenth century: Lisbon in 1848, Oporto in 1855, 
and Coimbra in 1856. However, gas networks did not spread to other cities 
until the 1880s, when several foreign gas companies tried to win new 
markets. Thus, only foreign enterprises tried to obtain franchise contracts 
in Portuguese cities during this period of expansion. The large investments 
needed to build a gas plant and to install the network explain this time-lag 
in the spread of the gas supply to smaller cities. Market considerations 
explain why the largest cities were the first to be served by the new power 
technology. 
A city’s gas supply monopoly was associated with the contract to 
provide public lighting throughout the municipality. This constituted a 
crucial step in ensuring an early consumer base, before the use of gas for 
domestic and industrial uses became widespread. As in the case of water 
supply, gas companies also tried to obtain long time periods for exclusive 
operation, in order to support the high sunk costs. 
In Lisbon gas production and distribution was first assigned to the 
Companhia Lisbonense de Iluminação a Gás. After 1887, the public 
lighting franchise contract was won by the Companhia Gás de Lisboa, the 
                                                   
59 The 1932 contract, which introduced major changes in the regulatory 
framework, will not be analyzed here. 
60 After 1926, there was a military coup that ended the democratic Republic. A 
non-parliamentary regime (the Estado Novo) emerged, which lasted for 48 years. 
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capital of which was mainly held by the Société Éclairage du Centre 
(Belgium), which won the bid, and by two former candidates for the 
franchise, Léon de Somzée (Brussels) and Kohn Reinach and Company 
(Paris).61 The Companhia Lisbonense de Iluminação a Gás competed with 
the new Companhia Gás de Lisboa to supply domestic and industrial 
consumers. This peculiar situation ended in 1891 when both companies 
merged to form the Companhias Reunidas de Gás e Electricidade (CRGE). 
When the new gas franchise contract was signed in 1887, electricity 
was already a possible competitor for street lighting. Therefore, the 
municipality pledged not to launch any other technology for lighting 
during the first 10 years, in order to secure the investments the company 
had to make in order to modernize the gas network. The duration of the 
franchise contract was also extended from 30 to 60 years in 1891. Gas for 
public lighting was sold below the general tariff and was to decrease at the 
same rate as the increase in the number of domestic consumers. Once 
private consumption reached 17 million cubic meters, gas for public 
lighting would be supplied free of charge. 
In Oporto its former concessionaire, Hardy Hislop, transferred the 
franchise contract to the Companhia Portuense de Iluminação a Gás.62 In 
1889, a new contract was made with the Companhia Gás do Porto, which 
continued to manage the service until its municipalization in 1920. 
Difficulties in the Creation of Gas Networks. There were differences in the 
creation and development of the Lisbon and Oporto gas networks. 
Although the steep slopes characteristic of both cities created installation 
difficulties, in the early years the Oporto gas company faced greater 
troubles than its Lisbon counterpart, owing to its plant location. In 
addition, the market’s response to the introduction of gas was also 
different in both cities. 
In Lisbon, gas plants were located in Boavista and in Belém, near 
the Tagus River, in industrial districts within the city, and not far away 
from the residential areas. In fact, the gas plant of the Companhia 
Lisbonense de Iluminação a Gás, built in 1848, was established 
downtown, near the Tagus River and the port. This facilitated the 
circulation of gas to upper areas of the city without using much pressure. 
The proximity to the river made it easier to import coal from England and 
allowed the smoke being emitted from the gas plant to be directed to the 
                                                   
61 See Alice M. Martins, Campos Martins e Coelho, and Adriano Pinto, “A fábrica 
de gás de Belém: os projectos e os processos de produção no final do séc XIX” 
[The Gas Factory in Belém: Projects and Production Processes at the End of the 
Nineteenth Century], Arqueologia & Indústria, 1988 . 
62 “A contract agreed between Hardy Hislop and the Board of the Companhia 
Portuense de Iluminação a Gaz on 16 August 1854,” AHMP-Casa do Infante. 
Documentos Originais. Obra Pública. 5751-1975, vol. 3 doc. 7. 
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river, reducing pollution in residential areas.63 The location of the new 
Sociedade Gás de Lisboa gas factory, built in 1887, was also near the river. 
However, none of these factories in Lisbon were very distant from 
residential districts and all remained close to Lisbon’s industrial areas. 
In contrast, the contract between the municipality of Oporto and 
Hardy Hislop specified that the gas plant should be constructed beyond 
the city limits, at a location with few inhabitants, on a plot of land 
provided by the city council. In order to evaluate the costs associated with 
the installation of gas plumbing into the city, Hardy Hislop asked the 
engineer Geddie Pearse to produce a city map and prepare a report on the 
technical and economic viability of the venture. This report provides an 
interesting account of the kind of technical and economic problems 
associated with setting up the gas networks.64 Pearse believed that the 
place chosen by the municipality had several inconveniences. First, the 
topographical characteristics of the plant site required significant work to 
level the soil. Second, it would be difficult to ship coal to the plant, despite 
its location near the river. Finally, the long distance from the city center 
would impose severe costs because the company would have to construct 
all the piping needed to serve the main residential areas. Eventually Hardy 
Hislop decided to build the gas plant on the land provided by the 
municipality. In the ensuing decades, the decision regarding the gas plant 
location and mistakes in the installation of both the plant and the piping 
regularly affected the gas supply. Furthermore, the periodic flows of the 
Douro interrupted gas production. The work to correct previous errors had 
a very negative financial impact. 
In Lisbon, it was the topography that made gas supply difficult. The 
city’s many hills and the fact that the residential nucleus was spread over a 
wide area meant the need to construct a large network. Moreover, the hills 
prevented stable gas pressure from being maintained in different areas, 
which led to diversity in the intensity of the lighting available. 
Payment for public lighting took into account the number of street 
lamps installed. Therefore, the average distance between each street lamp 
affected the revenue of the companies. As was mentioned in the 1856-1857 
Companhia Lisbonense de Iluminação a Gás annual report, in Paris there 
was a street lamp for every 25 linear meters of gas piping. In Lisbon, 
                                                   
63 Considering these advantages, the directors of the Companhia Lisbonense de 
Iluminação a Gás were against any proposal to transfer the factory to the 
outskirts of the city. See Relatório da Comissão eleita em 28 de Julho de 1858 
pela Assembleia Geral da Companhia Lisbonense de Iluminação a Gaz para 
examinar o relatório e as contas da direcção do ano económico de 1857 a 1858 
[Report from the Board elected in 28th July 1858 by the Companhia Lisbonense 
de Iluminação a Gaz shareholders assembly, to examine the Board’s report and 
accounts for the year 1857-1858] (Lisbon, 1858), 18. 
64 AHCMP—Casa do Infante. Documentos Originais—Obras Públicas. Papéis a 
avulsos sobre a iluminação a gás [Papers on Gas Lighting]. 
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however, there was only a street lamp every 54 meters. In Oporto, the 
distance between the street lamps was more than 45 meters. 
Several difficulties were also encountered during gas pipe 
installation. Initially the pipes used in Lisbon had to be constantly 
renewed, owing to their rapid deterioration. Thus, in 1876-1877 the old 
pipes had to be replaced. The opportunity was used to install larger pipes 
in the main line distributions. 
The installation of street lamps occurred at a different rhythm in 
Lisbon and Oporto (see Figure 1). In the largest city, the amount of street 
lighting increased at a regular pace during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Even when the population of the city grew at a higher 
rate in the 1880s,65 public lighting was able to follow urban expansion. 
Meanwhile, in the city of Oporto at the beginning of the franchise contract, 
there was an initial installation of street lighting in the commercial and 
residential districts but public lighting did not expand at the same rhythm 
as population growth. The disparity in the evolution of the ratio between 
street lamps and the population (Table 8) is the consequence of this 




                                                   
65 The 1880s experienced one of the largest rates of growth in the history of the 
Portuguese capital city. Álvaro Ferreira da Silva “A evolução da rede urbana 
portuguesa (1801-1940)” [The evolution of the Portuguese Urban Network”] in 
Análise Social, 1997, 143-144: 779-814. 
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Ratio between the number of street lamps and the population in Lisbon 
and Oporto, in percent 
 
Years Lisbon Oporto 
1857 1.26 0.21 
1878 1.72 1.70 
1891 2.74 1.81 
 
The piping for gas distribution inside buildings was the owners’ 
responsibility. The company supported the costs of construction up to the 
entrance into the building. When the buildings were grouped together and 
located near the main pipe, installation costs were not very high. However, 
when they were situated very far from the main pipe, extending piping was 
an expensive operation, the cost of which might not be compensated by 
the revenue received from future consumption. Therefore, the Oporto gas 
company started to finance piping installation to buildings that were not 
more than 50 meters away from the main pipe. Otherwise, the owners had 
to bear the installation costs. This meant that economies of contiguity 
were very important in these networks, assuming relevance similar to 
economies of scale in other industries. The spread of the urban population 
and the scattering of wealthy areas across the city were important factors 
in rising installation costs. 
Public-Private Conflicts and Regulation. The governador civil (regional 
representative of the central government), the municipalities, and the 
Public Health Committee regulated the operation of the gas companies. 
The municipalities had power to control and inspect the companies: the 
planning and installation of the network, the gas production equipment, 
the street lamps, and the quality of the energy supplied. This regulation 
evolved over the years, following the technological evolution of the 
industry and growth of the consumer base. 
This regulatory practice was the source of recurrent conflicts 
between the gas companies and the municipalities. Sometimes the 
conflicts were aggravated by the city councils’ financial difficulties when 
they were unable to pay for the gas consumed for public purposes (lighting 
the streets or public buildings). The Lisbon and Oporto municipalities 
tried to expand the area illuminated by gas lighting without incurring 
further expenditure by requiring less energy be provided to street lamps 
and that they should be lit at half power during nights with a full moon. 
Most conflicts between the municipalities and the gas companies 
arose from consumers’ complaints concerning leakages across the 
network. In the case of Lisbon, one of the first measures taken by the 
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CRGE after assuming responsibility for gas distribution was to begin work 
on the piping network “in order to, as quickly as possible, reduce the very 
large losses it had owing to the bad conditions of the network.”66 
The work undertaken on the network was another source of 
conflict, not only with the municipalities but also with the companies 
responsible for water supply. The area below ground, which was crossed 
by gas, water, and sewer pipes, required urban planning and a specialized 
cartography of the network infrastructure. This was rarely followed and 
the work carried out by water companies, gas companies, or intervention 
by the municipal services in the sewers affected the piping networks. In 
addition, the street surface was affected by the gas companies’ work, 
causing public concern and provoking conflict with the city council. 
Gas tariffs were another source of disagreement. Gas franchise 
contracts specified prices for gas sold to private consumers and 
municipalities. Therefore, the companies could not raise the tariffs without 
the municipality’s prior consent. In periods of economic crisis, gas 
consumption declined, affecting the companies’ revenue. When the price 
of imported coal increased to high levels, the gas companies tried to 
increase tariffs to reflect this, but they faced strong opposition from the 
municipalities. 
Gas consumed by the municipalities had a lower tariff than that for 
private consumption. In addition, when private consumers reached certain 
thresholds the companies had to provide gas for public lighting for free. 
This was also a source of recurrent conflicts between companies and 
municipalities, aggravated by the municipal debt to the gas 
concessionaires. The contracts for public lighting, which at the beginning 
of the network installation were important in providing a financial 
guarantee to private enterprise, began to seem unprofitable to the 
companies.67 
Consolidation of the Gas Network. Private consumption was low, due to 
the mild climate, which demanded little central heating, and the 
population’s low per-capita income. Nevertheless, at the end of the 
nineteenth century private and public consumption increased both in 
Lisbon and in Oporto. Figures 2 and 3 present the available evidence on 
the evolution of consumption and consumers in both cities. It is 
interesting to note that private consumption was higher than public 
consumption, the inverse of water provision at the time. 
 
                                                   
66 Relatório do Conselho de administração da CRGE 1891/1892 [Report from 
CRGE’s Board], 10. 
67 This aspect is stressed in the 1885 annual report of the Companhia Lisbonense 
de Iluminação a Gás. Relatório da Direcção e Parecer do Conselho Fiscal: 
Gerência de 1885 Report from the Board and advice from the Financial 
Committee] Companhia Lisbonense de Iluminação a Gás (Lisbon, 1886), 12. 
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FIGURE 2 
Gas consumed in Lisbon (1891-1920) 
Source: Anuários Estatísticos da Câmara Municipal do Porto 
(Oporto’s Municipal Council Statistical Yearbook) 1889-1893. 
The increase in private consumption may be explained by the 
spread of gas cookers. To promote this sort of domestic appliance, the 
CRGE created a shop where it exhibited cookers, other domestic 
appliances, and industrial equipment. It also began to loan, sell on credit, 
and assist domestic consumers with this type of equipment.68 In addition, 
the gas consumed for industrial uses had lower tariffs to increase its 
application as a power source. In both cities, the rise in gas consumption 
required the installation of new gas plants by the beginning of the 
twentieth century.69 
At the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, gas 
consumed in Lisbon stabilized, after several years of remarkable rise. The 
substitution of gas engines by industrial engines powered by electricity 
was the main reason for this. After the beginning of the First World War, 
an increase in the price of coal led to a decline in consumption. A rise in 
production costs was responsible for serious losses and the company 
                                                   
68 Relatório do Conselho de administração da CRGE-1892-1893 [Report from 
the CRGE Board], 6. 
69 Relatório do Conselho de administração da CRGE-1904-1905 [Report from 
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decided to suspend gas supply in 1918.70 The replacement of gas with 
electrical power for street lighting was the main result. 
FIGURE 3 












private consumption public consumption
 
Electricity as a Power Alternative for Private and Public Consumption. At 
the end of the nineteenth century, cities such as Vila Real, Braga, and 
Lisbon decided to adopt electric public lighting. In the early twentieth 
century, other cities followed their example, although in several towns the 
electricity option was complicated by contracts with gas companies for 
public lighting. For electricity companies, investing in providing energy 
merely for private consumption was risky as there was no guarantee that 
private consumption would support such a business venture. Thus, only a 
few electricity-producing companies were set up in urban centers where 
there were prior contracts for provision of public lighting. In Évora, for 
example, although a company was set up in 1905 to supply electricity only 
to private consumers, it struggled to obtain the public lighting contract, 
and finally succeeding 1917. 
In the early twentieth century, electricity was introduced in several 
towns at the initiative of industrial firms that started using power engines 
and tried to gain maximum profits by producing electricity for public 
lighting. A somewhat paradoxical situation emerged: small towns, 
sometimes located very far away from larger cities and with low levels of 
per capita income, benefited from an early introduction of electricity.71 
                                                   
70 Relatório do Conselho de administração da CRG, 1917-1918 [Report from the 
CRGE Board]. 
71 This was the case of Elvas, Reguengos de Monsaraz, Estremoz, Penalva do 
Castelo and Famalicão, where the use of electricity for industrial purposes was 
later extended to lighting. 
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Municipal authorities followed two distinct paths in the creation of 
electricity networks.72 In some cases, city councils granted franchise 
contracts, similar to those for water or gas provision. In such situations, 
although local authorities had the power to grant such rights, central 
government approval was required and there were strict legal limitations 
on the conditions under which councils could approve franchise 
contracts.73 In other cases, municipalities were directly involved in setting 
up and operating electric power production plants. 
Throughout the 1920s, there were several developments in the 
process of granting franchise contracts for the production and distribution 
of electricity. One of the first regionally-based companies to produce 
hydroelectric energy, União Eléctrica Nacional, founded in 1919 and 




Number of municipalities with electricity 
 
Years Municipalities % of municipalities 
1918 41 14.9 
1923 63 22.9 
1928 146 53.2 
1933 214 78.8 
1938 244 89.0 
1945 254 92.0 
 
Source: Maximiano Apolinário, “A indústria 
da energia eléctrica em Portugal” [The Electric Power 
Industry in Portugal], in Revista de Obras Públicas e 
Minas, 583-588 (Lisbon, 1918), Estatísticas das 
Instalações Eléctricas [Electrical Installations 
Statistics]. 
 
During the Dictatorship period, the policy of centralization initiated 
in 1926 was also applied to the electricity supply, although technical 
aspects were a determining factor. The provision of hydroelectric power 
was only feasible if it served more than one municipality. Therefore, in 
                                                   
72 See Jaime Alberto do Couto Ferreira and João José Monteiro Figueira, A 
electrificação do centro de Portugal no século XX [The Electrification in Central 
Portugal during the Twentieth Century] (s/l, 2001), 20-24. 
73 In 1912, the Regulamento das concessões de licenças para o estabelecimento e 
exploração de instalações eléctricas [Regulations for the Granting of Licenses for 
the Establishment and Operation of Electric Power Stations] was introduced and 
remained in force until 1936. 
74 Owned by the Empresa Electra del Lima Company. 
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1927 legislation was passed enabling the government to take the initiative 
for fostering the formation of regional organizations for the construction 
or operation of one or more networks for the distribution of electricity.75 
By 1934, 79 percent of district capitals had electricity for private 
and public lighting; municipalities operated 51 percent. This does not 
mean, however, that the electricity distribution network covered all towns, 
much less that it applied to the various urban centers in each district. In 
addition, in urban centers that benefited from electric lighting, the level of 
private consumption was extremely low: much lower than the average 
consumption for Europe. 
The private consumption of electricity only began to rise when 
regressive tariffs were introduced, beginning in the 1930s. The 5th 
Congress of the International Union of Producers and Distributors of 
Electric Energy (UNIPEDE) held in 1934 in Zurich and Lausanne, 
doubtless contributed to the adoption of such pricing policies. The 
engineer, Ferreira Dias, who attended the congress as the Portuguese 
representative, affirmed that at the meeting “without concealing its doubts 
and reticence as regards the novelty of such pricing (which has still not 
disappeared completely), the organisation accepted the new pricing 
system.”76 In Portugal, European pricing (graded charging for different 
types of use) was only introduced in 1937. 
When electricity became an alternative to gas for public lighting, 
the Companhia do Gás do Porto tried to obtain the concession to supply it. 
In the contract signed with the Oporto city council on February 7, 1894 the 
company agreed to supply electric power to the city. In an attempt to fulfill 
this obligation, the company bought a power station from another 
company, the Companhia Luz Eléctrica, which provided electricity to a 
small network of consumers. However, the size of the power station, as 
well as the dimensions of the network remained insufficient to provide 
public lightning. The company’s financial condition worsened the situation 
by preventing the construction of a new power station and network or even 
the expansion of the former power station. This project was successively 
postponed, even though the municipality reiterated that the contract 
should be fulfilled. The solution would be the creation of a new enterprise, 
the Sociedade de Energia Eléctrica do Porto, which brought together new 
foreign and domestic capital, as had the CRGE, the company providing gas 






                                                   
75 Decree 14.772, of 22 Dec. 1927. 
76 J. N. Ferreira Dias, Linha de Rumo I e II e outros escritos económicos 1926-
1962, Tomo II, Lisbon: Banco de Portugal, 1998, 207. 
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FIGURE 5 
Electricity consumed in Lisbon 
 
In Lisbon, the Companhia Reunidas de Gás e Electricidade was the 
result of a merger between two enterprises previously in operation. It 
continued to run the central power station in Avenida da Liberdade, 
where, in 1892, there were 37 arc lamps.77 The capacity of this power 
station was insufficient to significantly increase the electricity network. 
The construction of a more extensive network required a much greater 
investment and there had already been a major investment in the gas 
network. In order to support this effort, the Municipal Council promised to 
maintain lighting based on gas for at least 10 more years. In addition, the 
concession for electricity exploitation by the CRGE was extended for 30 
years.78 
As the CRGE exploited gas and electricity, there was no competition 
between alternative systems for lighting. Therefore, there was not much 
pressure on the company to lower the prices, as was the case in other cities 
where such competition did exist. In the same way, monopolistic 
exploitation of the Lisbon electricity network kept away competition from 
other electricity enterprises.79 
                                                   
77 Relatório do Conselho de administração da CRGE-1892/93 [Report from the 
CRGE’s Board], 8. 
78 Condition 5 of the contract between the City Council and the CRGE (Lisbon, 
1898), 5. 
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However, even if economic competition was not a determining 
factor in lowering electricity prices in Lisbon, the contracts between the 
municipality and the company regulated prices and conditions for 
supplying gas and electricity to the city. The defense of public interest and 
against any tendency to suffer the consequences of the monopolistic 
position of the company over the market were the principles behind this 
regulation, in the same way as was the case for the water supply. In order 
to guarantee that the city would not be in the dark (and suffer the 
inconvenience and threats to security that would pose), the municipality 
required the company to maintain gas lighting as a reserve network.80 This 
situation demanded parallel investments in gas and electricity networks 
for public lighting and negatively affected the expansion of the electric 
street lighting compared with the use of electricity in industry and at 
home. 
The capacity of the old power station in Avenida da Liberdade was 
not enough to significantly increase the electricity network. Therefore, a 
new power station was constructed in Boavista, which began operations in 
1903. During the following years, electricity consumption surpassed the 
company’s predictions, necessitating the installation of two other 1,500 
c/v units. The rise in consumption was the result of lower tariffs.81 In 
1906, electricity consumed increased 41 percent over the previous year, 
largely due to its use in industrial engines, which grew by 220 percent.82 
Until then, the use of new energy sources in industry had not affected the 
company’s gas revenues, because the engines substituted were mainly 
steam engines. However, in 1908 several industrial engines using gas were 
replaced by electrical ones, which caused a 198,695 cubic meter reduction 
in gas sales. At the same time, electricity consumption for industrial power 
increased from 200,000 Kwh in 1906 to more than 1,100,000 Kwh in 
1908.83 In the following years, there was a rise in both electricity 
consumption and the number of consumers (see Figure 5). Electricity 
consumed grew at a faster rate than the number of consumers, indicating 
that the power was largely employed for industrial uses. The increase in 
electricity consumption required construction of a new power station, the 
                                                   
80 See the 5th condition in the Contracto para a Nova Illuminação a Luz 
Electrica de diversas ruas, praças e avenidas celebrado com a Sociedade 
Companhias Reunidas Gaz e Electricidade em 25 de Fevereiro de 1905 [Contract 
for New Lighting in Several Streets, Squares and Avenues Celebrated with the 
Sociedade Companhias Reunidas Gaz e Electricidade 25 Feb. 1905) (Lisbon, 
1907), 5. 
81 Relatório do Conselho de administração da CRGE-1905/1906 [Report from 
the CRGE Board], 6. 
82 Relatório do Conselho de administração da CRGE-1907-1908 [Report from 
the CRGE Board], 5-6. 
83 Relatório do Conselho de administração da CRGE-1907-1908 [Report from 
the CRGE Board], 6. 
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Central Tejo, the first phase of construction of which was finished in 1911. 
The war prevented further power station expansion, and work resumed 
only after the end of conflict. 
After 1915, there was a decrease in electricity consumption, even 
though the number of consumers was rising. This was due to problems 
with the coal supply, which led the company to ask consumers to reduce 
their power consumption. An increase in tariffs also explains the reduction 
in per capita consumption. It was only after the end of the First World War 
that the coal supply was back to normal and electricity consumption 
reached its full potential. 
Electricity replaced gas for public lighting, but at a slower pace. In 
1905, the CRGE signed a contract with the municipality of Lisbon to 
substitute 177 street lamps powered by gas.84 The large investments the 
company had made in renewing the gas network for public lighting at the 
end of the nineteenth century explain this slow move to substituting 
electricity. In 1908, the number of electric street lamps rose to 293.85 
During 1917-1918, the war was responsible for a dramatic change. The 
company suspended gas supply for public lighting and replaced it with 
electrical energy and, in some cases, oil. 
The increase in electricity consumption required the construction of 
a new power station, the Central Tejo, the first phase of construction of 
which was finished in 1911. The war prevented the expansion of the power 
station, and work only resumed after the end of conflict. 
In Oporto, electricity supply began in 1909, when the power station 
Central do Ouro was finished. In 1912, the number of consumers reached 
1,250. Of these consumers, 100 used electricity as a source of industrial 
power and for lighting. In the following years, the number of consumers 
increased and by 1917 reached 4,303. 
A study of the companies’ installation of electrical cables provides 
an interesting comparison of the electrical power networks in operation in 
both cities (Table 10). The electrical power network was more extensive in 
Lisbon, as was the case in the street lighting comparison. In Oporto, the 
electricity supply was restricted to the city’s central districts. The city 
council recognized this situation after municipalization, but its financial 




                                                   
84 See condition 5th in the Contracto para a Nova Illuminação a Luz Electrica de 
diversas ruas, praças e avenidas celebrado com a Sociedade Companhias 
Reunidas Gaz e Electricidade em 25 de Fevereiro de 1905 [Contract for New 
Lighting in Several streets, Squares and Avenues Celebrated with the Sociedade 
Companhias Reunidas Gaz e Electricidade in 25 Feb. 1905] (Lisbon, 1907), 5. 
85 Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, Contracto de 28 de Novembro de 1908 com a 
Sociedade Companhias Reunidas de Gaz e Electricidade (Lisbon, 1911), 5. 
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TABLE 10 
Ratio between the linear meters of electrical cables and the 
population in Lisbon and Oporto, in percent 
 
Years Lisbon Oporto 
1911 62.87 17.68 
1920 89.44 38.51 
 
The municipalization of the Oporto electricity supply cannot be 
separated from the municipalization of the gas supply, owing to the close 
relationship between the companies operating these services. The First 
World War aggravated the losses of the Companhia do Gás. The rise in 
coal prices caused severe irregularities in gas supply, particularly for 
public lighting. After 1915, the municipality considered municipalization, 
but that did not occur until 1917, when the decision was made to also 
extend the public takeover to the Sociedade de Energia Eléctrica do Porto. 
This decision led to vigorous complaints by this enterprise, which argued 
that it should continue to operate normally. The municipality claimed that 
the transfer of the concession for electric public lighting between the two 
companies in 1907 was approved on the condition that the responsibility 
for public lighting would lie with the Companhia do Gás and would be 
associated either with the gas or the electricity supply. 
When the municipality began to run the Central do Ouro, the 
installation and engines could not provide the electricity needed to supply 
the city. Therefore, the city council asked for help from the Companhia de 
Carris de Ferro do Porto (an urban public transport operator) in order to 
ensure the supply of electricity to part of the city.86 Once they alleviated 
the pressure on the Central do Ouro, it was possible to repair the 
generators and resume regular electricity supply. 
In 1919, the war was over and the municipality hoped that the 
provision of gas and electricity would provide some profits, in order to 
compensate for prior investments, improve services, and extend the 
network. However, against all expectations, there was a deficit in 1919, a 
situation that continued until 1922. This deficit was partially caused by the 
fact that the tariffs for gas and electricity lagged behind inflation. 
However, the joint provision of gas and electricity brought together 
different costs related to the provision of the two services. Gas always 
produced losses. In contrast, the electricity supply was profitable, which 
produced a balance in the joint cost of the supply. 
In Lisbon, municipalization did not occur. The gas and electricity 
company suffered losses and had poor financial performance during the 
                                                   
86 Câmara Municipal do Porto, Parecer do Delegado Municipal, Director 
technico da Exploração sobre a Exploração futura dos mesmos serviços, ob. cit., 
5. 
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war period. However, the CRGE was not municipalized, a situation similar 
to that of the water company operating in the capital city. 
Conclusion 
These modern utilities had common characteristics associated with 
network infrastructures, namely the systemic approach used in designing, 
operating, and expanding them. High sunk costs and asset specificity were 
other shared features of these investments. There were also issues related 
to their operation as natural monopolies or the positive externalities 
resulting from their use and expansion. 
Therefore, there were also common themes behind the conflicts 
that caused local and state authorities to oppose private companies’ 
provision of water, gas, and electricity. Contractual design, tariffs, and the 
increased pressure on the streets constitute the primary reasons for the 
controversy. The first two points are directly related to the regulatory 
framework that was tentatively erected during the period. The last point 
highlights another common issue linking all these utilities. In fact, the new 
nineteenth-century urban infrastructures (gas, electricity, sanitation, and 
transport) all shared the use of public resources such as roads. This source 
of conflict derives from the trend towards rising and intense pressure on 
the city streets, not only as a means of circulation, but because the cables, 
pipes, or tubes necessary for the operation of the new urban 
infrastructures were placed under the pavement.87 
There were also some notable differences. One of them concerned 
barriers to entry, which were less important for gas and electricity supply 
than in water supply. The gas and electricity operations in Lisbon and 
Oporto created other enterprises that tendered bids for the franchise 
contract when it came to an end. The introduction of electricity provided 
competition with gas companies for public lighting, something that did not 
occur in the case of the water supply. Moreover, the technologies used for 
electricity production and distribution in the late nineteenth century 
provided limited economies of scale. The low voltages of the direct current 
systems restricted the size of the area that could be served by a central 
station. In addition, the direct current voltage used by companies during 
the 1880s and early 1890s could not easily be stepped up or down to 
match consumers’ requirements. Therefore, different types of users could 
segment the market (traction, incandescent lights for private lighting, or 
arc lights for street lighting). 
The conflicts also seem to have been less fierce in the case of gas 
and electricity than for the water supply. Two reasons may explain this 
difference. One of them is related to the easier contractual design 
                                                   
87 François Bédarida and Anthony R. Sutcliffe , “The street in the structure and 
life of the city: reflections on nineteenth-century London and Paris” in Modern 
industrial city. History, policy and survival, ed. Brice M. Stave (Beverly Hills, 
1981). 
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associated with the provision of one public good, street lighting, compared 
with the bundle of externalities connected with sanitation involved in 
supplying water. Measuring output and monitoring quality was easier in 
the case of lighting, compared with water provision. The number of lamps 
operating on a given night, the number that remained unlit, and the 
quality of the illumination could be easily controlled on a day-to-day basis. 
The quality of water and its provision to private consumers was less easily 
monitored. Another reason for the more intense clashes between 
municipalities and water companies involves the greater positive 
externalities associated with water supply, as well as its close relationship 
to the sewer network, which constitutes a single system, modern 
sanitation. We have emphasized the importance of this interrelationship 
as one of the reasons for conflicts between water companies and 
municipalities. 
The probability of becoming municipalized was not associated with 
the type of utility. Local conditions (political, financial, and business) seem 
to have been more important than the type of utility. Oporto municipalized 
all the modern networks we have addressed. In Lisbon, however, water, 
gas, and electricity companies remained private for a long time. In the case 
of water supply, the difficulties faced by the company were enormous, but 
it escaped municipalization. 
